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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper reflects on the background and merits of the forthcoming Irish challenge to the first 
pillar legal base of the Data Retention Directive in C-301/06 Ireland v. Council and European 
Parliament1 and attempts to place the case in a wider context, that of the relationship between 
Ireland and Europe. The paper considers, in particular, the nature of Irish practice with regard 
to litigating at European level and considers the low number of preliminary references from Irish 
courts to the Court of Justice and the historically low level of intervention of Government in 
cases before Court of Justice, despite the extraordinary composition of the Irish Supreme 
Court. Issues as to States litigating at European level and the “repeat player factor” in 
European litigation are analysed. The role that competence or legal base challenges plays in 
the dynamic of European relations is reflected on. The caselaw of the Court of Justice on 
competence and legal base generally has evolved considerably in recent times and the 
changes wrought by the Treaty of Lisbon are discussed briefly. The paper suggests that legal 
scholarship benefits from considering the dynamic between States and institutional actors 
before the Court of Justice and seeks to outline how legal scholarship could be enriched by 
drawing on political science themes in analysing challenges to the legal base of secondary 
Community law by Member State challenges.  
 
                                                 
1  OJ C 237 30.9.2006, p. 5. 
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1. THE DATA RETENTION CASE CHALLENGE: SETTING THE SCENE 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Ireland has initiated proceedings in Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Council and European 
Parliament2 in order to challenge the validity of the use of Article 95 of the EC Treaty as the 
legal basis for the Data Retention Directive.3 Ireland contends that the correct legal base for 
the Directive is in fact Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union.4 This paper seeks to place 
this litigation in a wider context and reflect on Irish litigation relating to the EU legal order. There 
appears to be an increasing tendency for Ireland to adopt “Euro-sceptic” strategies in its 
dealings at European level, whereby it frequently follows the lead of the United Kingdom in 
European affairs, perhaps more so than in its initial years of membership of the EU and the 
decision in this challenge will follow shortly after the rejection by the Irish people of the Treaty 
of Lisbon. Low rates of preliminary references from the Irish courts, low participation rates as 
interveners in litigation before the Court of Justice by the Irish States and a relatively poor 
compliance rate by the State with implementation of internal market legislation until recently 
have cumulatively characterised Ireland as litigator at European level. It seems difficult to 
suggest that Ireland could ever be a “repeat player” at European level, a concept derived from 
US political science theory, denoting corporate bodies or associations who litigate frequently or 
the converse of a once-off litigator. 5  The case of Ireland v. Council and European Parliament, 
however, involves Ireland acting as antagonistic litigator, challenging legal norms within the EU 
legal order and indicates a new dynamic in Irish-European litigation. Thus the purpose of the 
paper is not to consider the substantive merits of the case but rather to reflect on its impact and 
consequences. The trends emerging from distinct time period are set out here and tentative 
reflections are drawn therefrom.  
 
 
 
(a) Ireland and the Europe Union: A Changing Dynamic?  
 
The Irish Government came under considerable pressure recently not to opt-out of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty of Lisbon negotiations, now designated to have the same 
legal effect as the Treaties in the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet ratified. The Irish Government 
appeared likely to adopt a similar position to the UK as regards the Charter but relented at the 
last minute to pressure, particularly from Trade Union leaders. There are some suggestions 
                                                 
2 OJ C 237 30.9.2006, p. 5.  
3 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC OJ C 237 30.9.2006, p. 5.  Hereinafter 
the Data Retention Directive.  
4 The reasoning adopted by Ireland in its challenge to the Framework Decision appears to draw heavily upon the 
reasoning of the Court of Justice in its decision in 2006 (European Parliament v Council of the European Union (C-
317/04) [2006] ECR I-4721) annulling the Commission adequacy decision in the Data Protection Directive 
Framework, which purported to recognise the US as providing an adequate level of protection for the transfer of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an 
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (OJ 2004 L 183, p. 83, and corrigendum at OJ 2005 L 255, p. 168). 
5 Galanter “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations of the limits of legal change” (1974) 9 Law & Society 
95. 
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that a major obstacle to ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon other than by referendum would be 
hindered by the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  More controversially, 
pursuant to a Protocol attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, Ireland is not obliged to take part in, or 
be bound by the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.”6 Ireland and the UK may each 
decide to be involved in particular issues - they may opt in or opt out of particular decisions. 
This special arrangement for Ireland and the UK has been in existence since these areas came 
within the remit of the EU in 1999 in the Treaty of Amsterdam.7 The Treaty provides for the opt-
out for Ireland and the UK to continue. Ireland has issued a non-legally binding declaration that 
it proposes to opt in to decisions in this area to the maximum extent possible and to review the 
entire opt-out clause within three years. The Protocol as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon in 
this regard remains problematic in so far as it is reviewable 3 years from the date of ratification 
of the Treaty and may necessitate another referendum 3 years from the date of which the 
Treaty of Lisbon is ratified, if at all. Substantively, the continued policy of exclusion is adopted 
by Ireland on grounds of the sanctity of the common law legal system and the peculiarities of 
the borders of Ireland the UK. The recent rejection by the Irish people of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
discussed below in greater detail, in tandem with the Treaty negotiation stance recently 
adopted by Ireland has resulted in a particular dynamic to Irish- European relations and 
contextualises the challenge under discussion.  
 
 
(b) Background to the Data Retention Directive and the Irish challenge   
 
 
In 2004, France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK introduced a proposal for a draft framework 
decision under Title IV EU which would have harmonised data retention obligations of service 
providers. Directive 2006/24/EC was subsequently adopted which purported to harmonise the 
laws of the Member States with respect to data retention so as to ensure the data is available 
to investigate serious crime was adopted pursuant to Article 95 EC in response to terrorism 
concerns arising within the European Union, with its preamble specifically and explicitly 
referencing the London terrorist attacks of July 2005.8 However, in the adoption of the 
instrument, both Ireland and Slovakia were both outvoted in the Council of Ministers and 
notably, the Directive benefited from an unusually speedy conception and publication.  
 
 The decision of Ireland to challenge the Directive’s legal validity is closely associated with the 
former Minister for Justice, then aggrieved at being outvoted. Two Ministerial appointment have 
followed the said Minister in this position on account of domestic political changes9 and the 
extent to which the approach of the State to these proceedings will have changed as a result 
                                                 
6 Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice and Declaration by Ireland on Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice. 
7 In practice, Ireland has opted in to a number of decisions, for example, in relation to asylum and judicial co-
operation and has not exercised its right to opt in to others, for example, border controls. However, Case C-137/05 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union [2007] ECR 0000 entails 
that it may be increasingly difficult to “cherry pick” the State’s involvement in this regard.  
8 The Directive now imposes far-reaching obligations on the States inter alia, to retain, trace and identify telephone 
and Internet data. 
9 Minister Michael McDowell T.D. who instigated the litigation at issue lost his seat in the General Election of 2007 
and was succeeded by Minister Brian Lenihan T.D. and then Minister Dermot Ahern T.D. more recently in 2008.  
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remains a difficult question, in so far as the challenge is perceived as being closely associated 
with the former Minister only.10  
 
 
 
2. IRELAND IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS IN LITIGATION 
 
(a) Ireland and Article 234 EC preliminary reference ruling data 
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Source: Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law 
from the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw). 
 
 
Litigation from the Irish courts to the Court of Justice remains statistically low. In general terms, 
the numerical figures as to the number of preliminary references referred by Irish courts and 
quasi-judicial bodies to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 234 EC11 are very 
disappointing. A total of 51 preliminary references have been made by the Irish courts to the 
European Court of Justice since Ireland first joined the European Union in 1973-2008.12 In a 
thirty year study from the inception of Ireland’s membership (from 1973-2003) a total of 44 
references had been made.13 This figure appears rather bleakly against a backdrop of roundly 
communautaire and integrationist judicial co-operation and significantly more references 
                                                 
10 Ireland has not yet implemented the Directive. At domestic level a challenge has been initiated by Digital Rights 
Ireland, an interest group, against existing Irish data retention legislation on fundamental rights grounds and a 
preliminary reference may yet be forthcoming. 
11 Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from 
the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw). 
12 The High Court has made slightly more references than the Supreme Court. Accordingly, of the 49 references, 
22 were made by the High Court, 20 by the Supreme Court and the remaining few by inferior courts or non-court 
tribunals. Therefore, for practical purposes, the High and Supreme Courts generate most of the references 
between them.  
13 Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from 
the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw).  
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numerically at least from nearly every other State.14 The Irish courts refer the least number of 
cases per year across the Member States.15 In certain subject areas, such as to the European 
arrest warrant, the Irish courts may not seek a preliminary reference ruling from the Court of 
Justice as the State has yet to make a declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.16 
 
If we compare the total of 51 preliminary references over a thirty year period emanating from 
the Irish courts to that of the other so-called small-sized EU states such as Denmark, Austria, 
Finland and Portugal having regard to the first table above,17 we find the overall number of 
references from the Irish judiciary, from 1973 to the present day, to be relatively smaller than 
from any of these small-sized countries individually.18 Then from 2003-2008, discounting again 
new accession States, the data for Irish preliminary references made in this period is still lesser 
than that from other Member States. 
 
Using Denmark as a comparator (which acceded to the Community in 1973 along with Ireland), 
we see a significantly higher number of references in general from the Danish courts than their 
Irish counterparts. The contrast is all the more striking as to Austria, which while only recently 
acceding to membership of the EU, has gained notoriety for its courts keen usage of the Article 
234 EC mechanism, with double the number of references from 1995-2001 that Denmark had 
referred from 1973 to 2001.  
 
Extreme reluctance has been displayed by some of the courts of the newer Member States to 
engage in the preliminary reference dialogue with the Court of Justice.19 On balance, “older” 
pre-Nice Enlargement Member States appear to be involved in significantly more in preliminary 
reference proceedings by way of observations before the Court of Justice than newer post-nice 
Enlargement States, with the exception of Poland.20 “Older” or Founding EU States are also 
more likely to be engaged in extensive “defensive” behaviour before the Court of Justice in 
preliminary reference proceedings, rarely missing an opportunity to set out their stall.  
 
Political science theory would suggest that a pro-communautaire judicial regime would 
generate many references, as would a fractious dynamic between lower and higher courts.21 
                                                 
14 There are 2 exceptions to this: Sweden and Finland, both of which acceded in the 1995 wave of accessions and 
thus have shorter periods of membership of the Union. 
15 Source: Stone Sweet & Brunell “The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of 
Preliminary References 1961-1995” (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 14/1997), available at 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org. 
16 Thus the Irish State has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in respect of Third Pillar matters 
pursuant to Article 35 EU. See OJ 2005 L 327 p. 19. See Fahey “Being a Third Pillar Guardian of Fundamental 
Rights? The Irish Supreme Court and the European arrest warrant (2008) 33 European Law Review 563 
17 Whose populations stand approximately respectively in 2004 (the figures on which the 30 year study are 
predicated, itself ranging from 1973-2003) at:- Austria: 8.1 million, Denmark: 5.4 million, Finland: 5.2 million and 
Portugal 10.4 million (Source: http://www.unicef.org/statistics/index.html). Even when we compare the Irish total to 
that of Greece with a population of 2 ¾ times that of Ireland at 11 million approximately, which joined in 1980 
seven years after the Irish Republic joined, we see a noticeably larger number of references made by the Hellenic 
courts. 
18 This is with the exception of Finland but it must be taken into account that Finland only joined the EU in 1995. 
19 For example, in the case of Estonia this has been demonstrated to be the case: D’Sa & Lafranque “Getting to 
Know You: The Developing Relationship between National Courts of the “Newer” Member States and the 
European Court of Justice, with particular Reference to Estonia”  (2008) 19 European Business Law Review 311.   
20 Kapko & Weslowski “One-Shotters of Repeat Players? New Member States before the European Court of 
Justice” (2007) 10  European Judicial Review 55; (2007) 11  European Judicial Review 52. See also L. Malferrari, 
The Functional Representation of the Individuals’ Interests Before the EC Courts: The Evolution of the Remedies 
System and the Pluralistic Deficit in the EC (2005) 12 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 667. 
21 Alter Establishing the Supremacy of EC law (Oxford, 2001).  
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Key doctrines such as supremacy and direct effect were already in existence upon Ireland 
joining the EU in 1973 and a tension between ranks of courts is not discernible in the caselaw 
generally. In so far as Article 234 is indicative of any trends, Ireland has a very low rate of 
litigation where EU law is pleaded generally over a thirty year period and the preliminary 
reference statistics reflect this general trend in turn.22  
 
 
(b) Transposition Deficits, Article 226 EC Infringement Proceedings and Ireland 
 
It has been contended that the demand for involvement of the Court of Justice in national 
litigation might also depend upon how governments implemented EC law23 and so a high 
number of warning letters would correspond with a high number of references. Golub argues 
that States with poor implementation rates create situations where lawyers can easily question 
the conformity of national measures with EC secondary legislation.24 The publication of the 
Internal Market Scoreboard is a recent phenomenon emanating from the European 
Commission since 1997 as a means of gauging in both statistical and analytical format, 
Member State compliance with State obligations as to implementing European legislation, i.e. 
Single Market Directives.  
 
 
Transposition deficits decreased markedly over a period of a decade, from 1992 to 2002, 
corresponding closely to greater integration and economic prosperity achieved from the roll out 
of the single market. In 1992, approximately 1 in 5 directives had not been transposed by 
Member States.25 Irish transposition compliance has ameliorated significantly in recent years, 
reducing from a 5.4% to slightly above the aspired target of 1.5% in 2006.  It has now reached 
1% in 2008, although all Member States have dramatically increased non compliance with 
Internal Market transposition recently and 18 States in fact in total have reached this 1% target 
now.26  However, Ireland along with Austria, UK and Poland has the highest number of open 
infringement actions against it. In Environmental law cases, Ireland’s compliance with EU 
legislation remains at its worst and from1998-2003, Ireland had the highest number of 
infringement actions against it, topped only by Spain.27 The reasons for this lack of compliance 
are complex and multifarious but are frequently institutional or relate to the complexity of the 
planning law process in this jurisdiction or the financial cost of proactive Environmental 
management. Infringement actions involving Ireland thus potentially will decrease in the future 
and Golub’s contentions are less than evident currently in the context of Irish European 
litigation outside of Environmental law.  
 
 
(c) Interventions by Member States in preliminary reference proceedings- Irish 
observations 
 
 
                                                 
22 Fahey Practice and Procure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 Years of Article 234 EC Case Law from 
the Irish Courts (2007, Firstlaw). 
23 See Golub “Modelling Judicial Dialogue in the European Community: The Quantitative Basis of Preliminary 
References to the ECJ” (EUI Robert Schumann Centre Working Paper No. 58/96). 
24 Golub op.cit. 
25 See  www.europa.eu.int.  
26 Ibid.  
27 See www.europa.eu.int and the Annual Report of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/.  
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Granger’s study of the number of observations made by national governments in preliminary 
reference proceedings originating in their own courts in the period from 1995-1999, the Irish 
government is shown to have made the lowest number of observations in such instances of all 
the Member States, demonstrating low State participation and little attempt on its part to 
influence EU policies at this level.28 It has been shown that the Irish government makes a 
below average number of observations in the areas of free movement of goods, person, 
service, taxation, agriculture, approximation of laws, environment and consumers, competition, 
principles of EC law, company law and external relations. In the area of social policy, however, 
Ireland records an above average level of participation.29 A substantial increase in the number 
of interventions made in preliminary references and direct actions not relating to Ireland, ie 
where Ireland was a party to the case, is evident in the last three years (2005-2008), 
considered below in further detail.30  
 
In preliminary reference proceedings before the Court of Justice, Member States may submit 
written observations and make oral arguments at the hearing.31 Older EU States (pre-Nice 
Enlargement) have tended to participate by way of observations in more preliminary reference 
cases than newer States (post-Nice Enlargement), albeit that the gap is closing and that the 
knowledge deficit must be overcome with time.32 It has been suggested that Member States in 
submitting observations in preliminary reference proceedings only do so defensively and/ or 
limit their interventions to areas affecting the financial interests of their own States.33 Others by 
contrast do not miss an opportunity to participate, tending to comprise older States, wealthier 
and larger States. 
 
 Ireland has been suggested to be a State that engages only in important domestic cases, but 
bolstered by the ability to engage in seminal cases emanating from other Member States, 
benefits from this cost-effective strategy.34 From 1999-2003, Ireland made 18 observations in 
preliminary reference proceedings. From 2003-2007, Ireland made 42 observations in 
preliminary reference proceedings. Thus a multiple of interventions have been made in the 
most recent period. This also corresponds to a slight increase in the number of preliminary 
references emanating from Ireland in the same period. However, the increased figures in both 
instances do not necessarily correlate in that the Irish State is making observations in 
proceedings where the case does not emanate from the jurisdiction. The observations 
submitted by the Irish State have mostly been in finance-related areas, for example in VAT 
cases, and also in agriculture. Thus, the Irish State increasingly enters observations beyond 
those cases originating domestically and statistically the State is now engaging in a multiple of 
its previous intervention activities since 2003.  
 
From this much it can be deduced that a “c-change” in attitude to European litigation on the 
part of the Irish State is apparent and a more proactive and aggressive stance is being adopted 
by the State.  
                                                 
28 Granger “When governments go to Luxembourg…: the influence of governments on the Court of Justice” (2004) 
29 European Law Review 3, 8.  
29 Noticeably, however, Granger does not offer a more defined explanation of “social policy”.   
30 The preliminary reference rate in this period did not change, although the most active referring body is now the 
Supreme Court. See Fahey op.cit..  
31 Article 23 of the Statute of the Court and Article 104(4) of the Rules of Procedure.  
32 Kapko & Weslowski “One-Shotters of Repeat Players? New Member States before the European Court of 
Justice” (2007) 10 European Judicial Review 55; (2007) 11  European Judicial Review 52.  
33 Kapko & Weslowski “One-Shotters of Repeat Players? New Member States before the European Court of 
Justice” (2007) 10 European Judicial Review 55; (2007) 11  European Judicial Review 52. 
34 Ibid.       
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3. PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE IRISH REFERENDA ON EUROPEAN 
AFFAIRS 
 
 
Table Source: The Irish Times 
 
The Supreme Court decision in Crotty v. An Taoiseach35 of 1986 has entailed that a 
referendum on European Treaty ratification has been held consistently since that decision, 
which decided that a Treaty had to be submitted by referendum to the people where a 
proposed Treaty altered the scope and objectives of the Union such that the initial popular 
consent to European Union membership had been exceeded. Conservative analysis of the 
decision of the split Supreme Court in Crotty has entailed that all Treaties subsequent to the 
Single European Act have been submitted by plebiscite to the Irish people. The Irish electorate 
has been broadly in favour of the European Union according to decades of Eurobarometer 
polls and membership thereof has entailed that a high turnout in European related referenda 
has been equated with the success thereof until recently.36 The Third Amendment to the 
Constitution Bill was passed by plebiscite in 1972 by 1,041,890 votes (82.4% of the voting 
electorate) in favour of the amendment, 211,891 against.37 The Maastricht Treaty was passed 
by 68.7% of the electorate) in 1993, the Amsterdam Treaty was passed by 61.7% of the voting 
electorate) (1993-1999), the Nice Treaty was passed on a 2nd successful (the first referendum 
being unsuccessful) by 63% of the voting electorate.38  
 
The most recent Lisbon Treaty referendum was rejected by 53.4% of the population (862,415) 
where the turnout was 53.1% (1,614,866), thereby precipitating a constitutional crisis of sorts at 
national and European level. Evidence has tended to suggest that prior to the Lisbon Treaty, 
that turnout was critical and that the higher the proportion of the electorate that voted, the 
higher the likelihood of its success. This thesis would appear to have been disproven by the 
                                                 
35 [1987] IR 713.  
36See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm and Sinnott, Richard and Stephen Quinlan 'Soft Supporters 
of the EU need to be inspired to vote Yes to Lisbon Treaty'  The Irish Times, Wednesday 30 January 2008.  
37 See Hogan & Whyte Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th ed., Lexis-Nexis, 2003) para 5.3.45 et seq. 
38 See also Hourihane ed. Ireland and the European Union: The First Thirty Years 1973-2002 (Lilliput, 2003) and 
Costello “Peoples’ Vengeances: Ireland’s Nice Referenda” (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 357. 
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Lisbon referendum, which was held on a weekday arguably inconveniencing some of the 
working electorate or urban dwelling citizens or students residing away from their hometown 
(and rural) constituencies, thereby discouraging travel for voting purposes. Middle class voters 
tended to vote in favour of the Treaty, whereas working class voters tended to oppose the 
treaty. The heightened anti European sentiments evident from the Treaty vote outcome in 2008 
clearly indicate a shift in public opinion away from previous trends and popular support for the 
Treaty rejection itself is apparent from recent opinion polls.39  
 
 
4. PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF EUROPEAN UNION AFFAIRS IN IRELAND 
 
A system of effectively organised domestic parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation is 
now a commonplace feature of the legal and often constitutional orders of all European 
Member States.40 One of the most overdue yet fundamental legislative measures ever 
introduced by the Irish Oireachtas is surely the European Union (Scrutiny) Act, 2002, enacted 
to ensure greater scrutiny of EU legislation by the Houses of the Oireachtas.41 However, the 
legislative history of the Act of 2002 has interesting origins, relating to the redress the anti-
European electoral feeling after the first failed Treaty of Nice referendum and not any 
benevolent pro-European governmental sentiments.42 Parliamentary scrutiny is not 
constitutionally based unlike other States and the measures subjected to scrutiny remain 
particularly limited in comparison with other jurisdictions.43 The provisions of the Treaty of 
Lisbon would significantly ameliorate the current provisions in Irish law relating to parliamentary 
scrutiny of European-related legislation, should they take effect. The impact of a weak scrutiny 
regime on litigation is complex. On one level, litigation might be expected to be more prevalent 
in such an environment. This, however, need not necessarily be the case and the web of actors 
involved in European litigation relating to any State is diverse and not readily explicable. 
Nonetheless, major innovations in the relationship between States and the European Union 
have been wrought through the dynamic parliamentary action and analysis (for example in the 
UK, France and Germany), none of which are evident as to Ireland.44  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
39 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm  
40 See House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union Review Of Scrutiny Of European Legislation 
(First Report, 2002-2003, HL Paper 15, Appendix 4). See Fahey “Reflecting On The Scope Of The European 
Union (Scrutiny) Act, 2002 and Parliamentary Scrutiny in the Draft Constitutional Treaty as to European Integration 
and the Irish Legal Order” (2007) 13 European Public Law 66. 
41Whilst a modest form of parliamentary legislative scrutiny had originally been in place at the inception of 
Community membership, in the form of the European Communities Act, 1972,  it in turn was to be amended on the 
grounds on criticism as to its deficiencies: see Robinson “The Irish European Communities Act, 1972” (1973) 10 
Common Market Law Review 352 and 467. 
42 See Travers “The Reception of Community Legislation into Irish Law and Related Issues Revisited” (2003) 37 
Irish Jurist 58.  
43 Barrett “The king is dead, long live the king”: the recasting by the Treaty of Lisbon of the provisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty concerning national parliaments (2008) 33 European Law Review 66 and  
Barrett ed., National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the Oireachtas and 
Other Member State Legislatures (Clarus Press, 2008). 
44 See Barrett ed., National Parliaments and the European Union: The Constitutional Challenge for the 
Oireachtas and Other Member State Legislatures (Clarus Press, 2008).  
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Ireland has yet to establish itself as a repeat player in European litigation but discernible trends 
in litigation are becoming more evident with the passage of time, trends that impact on the 
analysis of Ireland litigating European affairs. The variety of actors involved in the web of 
relationships making up such litigation before the Court of Justice entails that analysis is not 
uncomplicated. The recent rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon underscores the shifting dynamic. It 
seems likely that the Data Retention Case challenge indicates that the Irish State is asserting a 
new constitutional position. However, a cumulative picture is difficult to present in advance of 
an outcome to the Treaty of Lisbon ratification crisis.  
